We describe a method for extracting Mel-Frequency and BarkFrequency Cepstral Coefficient from an encrypted signal without having to decrypt any intermediate values. To do so, we introduce a novel approach for approximating the value of logarithms given encrypted input data. This method works over any interval for which logarithms are defined and bounded.
Introduction
Perhaps the most fundamental operation for speech processing, image processing, and digital signal processing in general is the Fourier transform. Being able to perform the Fourier transform in a privacy-preserving manner is key to the creation of privacy-preserving algorithms in these domains. Speech signals in particular contain some of the most sensitive information that we produce, both because of their content (what was said) and because of the way that the content was produced (who was saying it). The benefits of having privacy-preserving speech processing algorithms are three-fold. First, of course, there is preserving the privacy of users who send inputs to speech processing systems. Second, they would revolutionize the accuracy of systems which require a lot of varied and sensitive training data (e.g., automatic speech recognition systems). Third, the less information that a company stores or processes in the clear, the less likely they are to leak customer data as a result of getting hacked.
Related Work.
[1] propose a related method for approximating natural logarithms in the context of image brightness/contrast filtering. Whereas their method determines what we shall call an accuracy parameter, φ, by reverseengineering their Taylor series expansion of the logarithm from a given acceptable error bound, however, ours is determined experimentally from an analysis (in the clear) of word error rates (WERs), and uses a novel table-lookup strategy [2] rather than a Taylor series.
[3] proposed a secure keyword recognition algorithm which makes use of HMMs. In this protocol, Alice has a speech signal, which she splits into T frames xi ∈ R d for i = 1, 2, ..., T , where d is the dimension of the feature vector used (MFCCs of d = 39 are used). Bob has ∆ HMMs, each trained on one keyword. Though ingenious, [3] 's secure keyword spotter solves a problem in which a client sends an encrypted speech sample to a server for secure keyword search with the client's cooperation. The client's device must itself perform the feature extraction calculations and, in the protocol proposed, also calculate intermediate values (namely, logarithms) in a cooperative manner by means of oblivious transfer and secure two-party computation. An approach that would be more likely to be in demand is one in which a server itself is able to store both the encrypted speech data and a secure algorithm that can perform homomorphically encrypted computations on the encrypted data without relying on the client. This brings up the issue of secure feature extraction from an encrypted speech signal. To our knowledge, the issue of how to conduct secure feature extraction on an encrypted speech signal has thus far been ignored by the community. Instead, it has been assumed that Alice has access to the recording and is able to extract features (usually MFCCs) herself, encrypt them, and send the encrypted features to Bob.
Contributions.
We describe how to extract speech features, specifically Bark-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (BFCCs) and Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs), from an encrypted signal. In doing so, we also describe an approach for approximating the value of a logarithm given encrypted input data, without needing to decrypt any intermediate values before obtaining the function's output. Furthermore, we study how the floating point precision of speech signals, MFCCs, and BFCCs affect the WER of 10 different speech recognition systems.
Background

Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes allow for computations to be performed on encrypted data without needing to decrypt the data. Figure 1 illustrates a typical example of how homomorphic encryption can be used to process a user's data. For this work, we use Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) fully homomorphic encryption [4, 5] , with improvements to encryption and homomorphic multiplication of [6] . This scheme is implemented in the PALISADE Lattice Cryptography Library 1 . But our proposal can be implemented using any HE scheme that allows for multiple addition and component-wise multiplication operations in the encrypted domain.
Notation and Scheme Overview
We will be using the same notation as in [5] , but as we provide only a brief overview of the homomorphic encryption scheme in this paper, the specific optimizations introduced in [5, 6] will not be discussed. Using homomorphic encryption, we are able to perform linear (i.e., multiplication, addition, or both) and, Figure 1 : Using homomorphic encryption, a data owner is able to encrypt their speech sequences, send them to the cloud for processing, then receive and decrypt the results without anybody else (not even the service provider) ever having the ability to decrypt the input or output data.
depending on the encryption scheme, polynomial operations on encrypted data. We can neither divide a ciphertext, nor exponentiate using an encrypted exponent. However, we can separately keep track of a numerator and a corresponding denominator. For clarity, we shall refer to the encrypted version of values * as E( * ), component-wise addition as E( * ) + E( * ), and component-wise multiplication as E( * ) * E( * ). A more detailed description of the BFV scheme follows:
) be an integer ring, where g(x) ∈ Z[x] is a monic irreducible polynomial of degree d. Bold lowercase letters denote elements of R and their coefficients will be denoted by indices (e.g.,
Zq denotes the set of integers (−q/2, q/2], where q > 1 is a power of 2. The secret key is called sk = (1, s), where s ← R 2 . The public key is called pk = ([−(a · s + e)]q, a), where a ← Rq, e ← χ. The plaintext space is taken as Rp for some integer modulus p > 1. Let ∆ ≡ q/p and rp(q) ≡ q mod p, so that q = ∆ · p + rp(q).
We use the following operations:
• Encrypt(pk,m):
• Mul(ct1, ct2): For this paper, we use componentwise multiplication, a simplified description of which is:
. We omit the details for obtaining this result [5] .
Setting
Correctness. An appropriate multiplicative depth at the parameters-generation step of our method for correctness to be guaranteed. Error resulting from ciphertext multiplication is reduced using the scale-invariant method [4, 5] .
Security.
The BFV scheme has semantic security [7] , which means that "whatever an eavesdropper can compute about the cleartext given the cyphertext, he can also compute without the cyphertext" [8] . A malicious adversary will neither be able to learn anything about a user's inputs nor about the intermediate and output values of the algorithm. To calculate the BFCCs of an encrypted signal we set the BFV scheme's parameters as follows:
• Plaintext Modulus = 14942209,
• Root Hermite Factor = 1.006,
• m = 32768,
• Ciphertext Modulus = 2037035672919629476175426 7584669403052717435612598398430688180935286 49268397111195699118081.
For our experiments, we chose parameters that give over a 128-bit security level the values presented in [7] . This means that it would take over 2 128 computations to crack the decryption key. We use an Intel Core i-7-8650U CPU @ 1.90GHz and a 16GB RAM for the computations.
Integrity. The BFV scheme itself does not guarantee the integrity of the results that a service provider sends back to a user and our algorithm does not ensure that a server will run the code that they say they will.
Encoding Variables
The very first step for converting an algorithm into HE-friendly form is to make the data amenable to HE analysis. For the BFV scheme, this includes transforming floating point numbers into integers by computing an approximate rational representation for them. This can be done by multiplying the floating point numbers with a pre-specified power of 10 and then rounding or truncating to the nearest integer [9] . We use truncation. We based our encoding on the method suggested in [10] : choose the number of decimal places to be retained based on a desired level of accuracy φ, then multiply the data by 10 φ and round to the nearest integer. Though straightforward, there had not yet been tests of which values of φ would lead to decent accuracies for various tasks. These are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for ASR performed on TIMIT.
Mel-and Bark-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
BFCCs vs MFCCs
BFCCs and MFCCs produce approximately the same performance in speech recognition tasks [11] . We verify this independently (see Figure 2) . We choose to use the Bark scale rather than the Mel scale given that it is easier to compute under the limitations presented by homomorphic encryption schemes:non-polynomial operations are very computationally expensive to perform and we want to limit the quantity required. While the Bark scale can be computed using the Traunmüller equation [12] , the Mel scale requires one to calculate the logarithm of variables. If desired, the logarithm operation of the Mel scale can be approximated through the use of the method presented in Section 3.4 or by using the secure two-party computation method presented in [3] . However, these are both comparatively computationally inefficient options. We shall, from now on, only discuss MFCCs with the purpose of comparing the WERs of systems which them vs. BFCCs as inputs. 
Real Discrete Fourier Transform
The operations for performing the Real Discrete Fourier Transform (RDFT) can be found in [13] . We adapt them for our task:
(1)
where N is the number of samples, x(·) is the vector representing the audio signal, and
The value of φ = 2 for the sine and cosine multipliers 10 φ was chosen by experimentally choosing the minimal value φ that had acceptable accuracy relative to the actual unencrypted RDFT values (not shown here because of space considerations). Note that sines and cosines themselves, and thus multiplication by 10 φ , can be calculated in plaintext prior to encryption. Using the parameters listed in Section 2.3, it takes 46523.5 ms to calculate the RDFTs of 100 frames, given a sample rate of 16, a frame length of 25, and a shift length of 10.
Bark Scale
We use [12] 's Bark scale equation, adapted for our task, with an empirically tested φ (see Figure 5 ).
Critical band rate (bark) = 26.81 * f * 10 2 − ((0.53 * 10 2 ) * (1960 + f ))
Computing the Bark scale necessitates keeping track of both a numerator and a denominator, since we cannot perform division in the encrypted domain. We will dispense with the divisor next. Using the parameters in Section 2.3, it takes 315.26 ms to run the Bark scale on the frequencies from the previous step.
Logarithm
To most accurately calculate logarithms in the encrypted domain, we will use a lookup-table-based method requiring log 2 (n) + 2 multiplications, where n is the size of the lookup table. We adapt this method from [2] . The idea is that, given an encrypted value E(x), a vector of values v = v1, v2, ..., vn, 0 and a corresponding lookup table vector, l = log 10 (v1), log 10 (v2), ..., log 10 (vn), 0 , it is possible to calculate which E(vi) is equal to E(x) without ever compromising the security of E(x). We can thus extract E(log 10 (x)). A thorough description of this method is beyond the scope of this paper. This method works on any interval for which the logarithm is defined and range-bounded.
With it, we can calculate the logarithm of both the numerator and the denominator resulting from the previous step. Since division corresponds to subtraction in the log domain, we can perform encrypted subtraction to reduce the representation to a single number, with negligible cost.
With the parameters we have selected, the size of one full vector that's most tractable for the logarithm calculation is at most 256 + 1. We can, of course, use multiple vectors of this size in order to expand the precision of the logarithms that we are calculating. This should be selected according to the expected range of values as well as the output precision best suited for a given task. Using the parameters listed in Section 2.3, it takes 143005 ms (resp. 346 s) to calculate the logarithm of a value when using a lookup table of size 128 + 1 (resp. 256 + 1). Although this is far from the efficiency are we used to when performing calculations in the unencrypted domain, these computations are highly parallelizable. The tables themselves can be created in a compilation step with a method that has linear-time online complexity, but tables can be very large -the experiments in Section 4 requested logarithms for roughly 9 × 10 6 values distributed over the interval (2×10 −1 , 2.13×10 11 ). Efficient representations of these tables will be an important topic for future research.
Discrete Cosine Transform
To calculate the Discrete Cosine Transform, we simply use Equation 1, but with E(x(k)) now being the log of the BarkScaled RDFT of the encrypted signal.
Numerical Analysis
Since we are only able to perform operations on integers when using the BFV homomorphic encryption scheme, we conduct three experiments to determine how much the word error rate of automatic speech recognition systems trained and tested on the TIMIT database is affected by (1) signal inputs at various precisions when using MFCCs (see Figure 3) , (2) MFCCs at various precisions (see Figure 4 ) and (3) using BFCCs with a Bark scale at various precisions (see Figure 5 ). We use Kaldi Figure 4 shows us that using the original float representation and truncating the value of the MFCC features to an integer (φ = 0) both give very similar WERs for MFCCs.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have described a method for extracting Bark-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients from an encrypted signal without having to decrypt any intermediate values. In doing so, we have also experimented with a novel approach for approximating the value of logarithms, given encrypted input data, without needing to decrypt any intermediate values before obtaining the function's output. We have tested how realistic our approach would be if the resulting coefficients were to be used as inputs to ten different kinds of automatic speech recognition systems.
Note that, given the RDFT, it would be easy to calculate jitter, which measures whether a gesture is sustained over a short period of time and can be used to identify certain pathological voices [14] . This can be done using the equation: where Ti are the extracted F0 period lengths and N is the number of extracted F0 periods [15] .
Shimmer measures whether the loudness of a sound is sustained over a short period of time. Just like jitter, it can be used to identify pathological voices. We can use the equation:
|20 log(Ai+1/Ai)|.
These can be useful for privacy-preserving healthcare applications or privacy-preserving speaker recognition, which we intend to address more thoroughly in future work.
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